Introduction
In this chapter we test how different institutional environments and associated collaborative types of labour management practices at firm level improve firm performance in European countries.
The European 'social model' suggests that the existence of a collaborative approach to companies' relations with employees has historic political origins (Martens, 1999) . In the German case, arguably at the centre of this model, a political consensus that aspects of 'liberalisation' are required has long been developing (Lane, 2000; . Equally, at the European level, it has been argued that the European Employment Strategy, now in place for over ten years, threatens to crowd out the EU's more traditional rights-based approach to employment regulation in the name of job creation (Fredman, 2006) . It is therefore important to evaluate the argument that the efficiency benefits of collaborative practices encouraged by rights-based approaches are inextricably linked to the benefits that employees derive from them (Akerlof, 1982) . In short, there is a need for an evaluation of the traditional emphasis on employment rights and related supportive institutional structures that constitute the European social model. Many previous studies have attempted to establish a link between HRM strategies towards labour and profitability, but these have been criticised for omitting employee relations variables (Wright and Haggerty, 2005) . We examine two specific types of managerial approaches to employer-employee relations as defined by Gooderham, Nordhaug and Ringdal (1999) to establish how effective each type is in enhancing organisational performance in different national contexts. These two forms -'collaborative' and 'calculative' HRM -are essentially defined by the degree to which employee involvement and participation are emphasized. The Gooderham et al. (1999) categories are essentially statistical constructs that may conflate or ignore important elements of HRM practice. We therefore augment the analysis of collaborative practices as defined by Gooderham et al. with other indicators that explicitly consider the role of teams and employee consultative committees.
We theoretically elaborate and empirically test the proposition that collaborative practices are more likely to enhance the labour extraction process and firm performance than calculative alternatives. For the empirical analysis we use Cranet. Our examination of European firms supports the proposition that in those countries where the institutional setting is most conducive, collaborative organisational level practices enhance the labour extraction process and lead to superior firm performance. Calculative practices have a weaker impact on the labour extraction function and firm performance.
The chapter is organised as follows. In the following section, we review literature on the link between institutional settings and management strategies towards labour and develop a theoretical framework to analyse relationships in different national institutional environments. We also develop our hypotheses for evaluating relationships between such management practices and institutional settings. We describe the data used and the scaling procedures employed in order to create our measures and we then test our propositions empirically. We show that resolving the inherent employer-employee conflict of interest by adopting optimal practices at organisational level corresponding to the national institutional setting is efficient and ultimately can be welfare improving and we discuss these results and draw conclusions in the final section of the chapter.
Institutional setting, management strategies towards labour and firm performance
Different national institutional frameworks support different managerial strategies. As noted in Chapter X, the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has variants, categorising countries and grouping them either by 'Variety' (Hall and Soskice, 2001) or 'business system' (Whitley, 1999) . The USA, Britain and Ireland are invariably put into one category ('Liberal Market Economies' [Hall and Soskice, 2001] or 'compartmentalised' [Whitley, 1999] ) and those of Western Europe into another ('Co-ordinated Market Economies' [Hall and Soskice, 2001 ]; 'collaborative' [Whitley, 1999] ). The extent to which institutional complementarities within systems help develop high-trust relations at the organisational level is a defining characteristic of national systems (Amable, 2003; Goergen, Chahine, Brewster and Wood, forthcoming; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999) . Whitley (1999) places particular emphasis on the importance of co-operation between employers and employees, as demonstrated in the analytical significance of his 'employer-employee interdependence' concept, described as the degree to which both parties are willing to invest in each other. The implication is that where interdependence is encouraged by the systemic institutional context and is relatively well-developed, this will in turn raise levels of mutual investment and efficiency, productivity and quality. Systemic features in the economies categorised by Whitley (1999) as 'co-operative' serve to support the development of high-trust relations, and the converse is also true for his 'compartmentalised' (broadly equivalent to the 'low trust' or liberal market economies(LME)) category (Harcourt and Wood, 2007) .
The formal institution of teamwork by management may both reflect and entail different degrees of delegation and therefore trust to the teams, but the very fact of their institution by management requires a certain minimum level of trust (Tzafrir, 2005) . Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) and Tzafrir (2005) show that despite considerable variation, high-trust relations between management and employees are associated with team working and especially with its more autonomous forms. Trust is likely to be further built by collective consultative mechanisms that, again allowing for degrees of variation between them, give employees an opportunity for 'voice' (see Chapter X). These mechanisms afford a degree of protection to individuals exercising voice. The collective provides support, encouragement and some protection to individual workers via its capacity to take sanctions against those threatening its members . Finally, group payment systems in general also tend to increase workers decision-making latitude and to reinforce employee collectives in relation to management and are therefore viewed negatively by 'calculative' forms of management strategies which stress individual rewards for individual effort (Legge, 1995) .
Some forms of management strategies emphasise collaboration between employees and employers and others do not (Gooderham et al., 1999) . Gooderham et al. (1999: 510) argue that human resource management entails an 'inherent duality' between 'strong economic calculative considerations and ….. a more humanistic orientation' and therefore distinguish two types of practice: 'collaborative' and 'calculative', structured by both agency and institutional settings in different countries. The indicators of the two forms that they develop are shown in Table 1 Levine and D'Andrea Tyson (1990) , amongst others, report that substantial shop floor participation leads to some combination of an increase in satisfaction, commitment, quality, and productivity, and a reduction in labour turnover and absenteeism. Therefore, we further extend our analysis of performance by relating labour extraction measures: absenteeism (abse) and turnover (turn) to various factors affecting the extraction function. Low turnover has been shown to have a considerable affect on the effectiveness of HPWSs in generating improved results in the US context (Guthrie et al., 2004) .
In the spirit of Bowles (1985) , Gordon (1994) , and Osterman (1994) we view these human resource management strategies as instruments designed to enhance the 'labour extraction function'. Our first argument is that the labour extraction function should be viewed as endogenously determined by the interaction of the institutional environment and firm-specific practices (e.g., Bowles, 1985) . Our second argument, pursued in parallel with the first, is that collaborative forms of HRM are more likely to enhance the labour extraction process and bring improved performance than calculative alternatives (e.g., Levine and D'Andrea Tyson, 1990) . Third, we argue that the different forms of practices are likely to be differentially supported by different institutional frameworks (Gooderham et al., 1999) .
There have been many attempts, especially by American authors, to link human resource management policies and practices and firm performance; we make no attempt to review them here (for reviews, see Guest et al., 2003; Paauwe, 2009; Wright and Haggerty, 2005) . Early studies tended to link a limited set of management practices to outcomes (see, for example, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, 1991) . Later studies, inspired by the 'High Performance Work Systems' (HPWS) paradigm, identified bundles of practices that were linked with superior organisational performance (Appelbaum et al, 2000; Becker and Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Stavrou, Brewster and Charalambous, 2010) . However, there have also been empirical studies yielding negative results (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001 ) and the HPWS school of thought has been criticised for failing to recognise that conflicts in the employment relationship are likely to limit HRM effectiveness (Godard, 2004 ). Godard's (2004) criticism is consistent with that made of the HPWS literature by Wright and Haggerty (2005) who argue that there are missing variables in the discussion (those normally used are typically pay linked to productivity and promotion possibilities). The missing variables are those linked both to employee relations broadly conceived and those relating to collaborative, trustbuilding practices. We therefore adopt a method that meets these criticisms by testing the links between two types of management practices encapsulating two different employeeemployer relations paradigms and firm performance. These variables are particularly relevant in Europe, where employment relationships (even in the UK) are characterised by a relatively strong collective dimension in comparison to the USA (Hall and Gingerich, 2005 ).
An alternative, less satisfactory framework for analysing the link between labour use and organisational performance is that of neoclassical efficiency-wage theory. The theory treats workers' motivation as exogenous to the firm and the industrial relations system (note that employee motivation is assumed to depend solely on the real wage rate and intensity of monitoring). Yet, from the lack of trade-off between wages and monitoring shown in studies of 'high and low trust' national groupings, it follows that employees' motivation must be treated as endogenous to the nature of labour-management relations (Gordon, 1994; Naastepad and Storm, 2006) .
There are other aspects of the labour extraction function (which may not be directly driven by management practices in relation to labour) that are, by and large, indicators of high-trust relations. A minimum degree of co-operation is a necessary condition of production, but the level of co-operation may be raised if trust is at a high level (Akerlof, 1982) . Trust, defined as the supposition by each side that the other will act benevolently, is more fragile and conditional on the perceived solidity of institutional guarantees (Creed and Miles, 1996; Goergen et al., forthcoming; Hoff, 2002) . Levels of trust may show some consistency across organisations, but are also likely to vary between different work and occupational groups, and employee strata; the difference between different employee strata is reflected in the Gooderham et al. (1999) indicators.
As Buchele and Christiansen (1999, p. 91) argue, continuous improvements in productivity depend not on individual efforts, but on the effective interaction among workers (teamwork), among work groups or departments (coordination), and between management and workers (cooperation). Baldamus (1961) argued that effort cannot be measured, and therefore management monitoring of employees had to be subordinated to motivational methods; the extent to which employees' ideas of trust and teamwork were influenced by management become of vital importance to superior company performance. Because no contract can be complete, a degree of control will always remain with employees, necessitating management efforts to build trust, reflected in efforts to influence employees' underlying emotions (Baldamus, 1961, p.41 ).
Akerlof (1982) similarly shows that individuals' productive behaviour is determined by the social definition of the situation adopted by the relevant workers. Akerlof (1982) focuses on the implicit gift-exchange nature of employment arrangements, where exchange is based on reciprocity and trust and relations are endogenously determined.
1 Management has to make constant efforts to influence these relations (MacInnes et al., 1985) . Further, employees' willingness to give up the protection offered by rigid work rules, disclose their proprietary (tacit) knowledge, and initiate changes in the production process that raise labour productivity and the firm's capacity for innovation, depends, to a large extent, on management committing to 'high-trust' work practices (Buchele and Christiansen, 1999; Naastepad and Storm, 2006) . The (Taylorist) alternative is high levels of employee monitoring, which threaten to undermine trust. The implication is that cooperative and group-based practices with strong implicit gift exchanges will tend to enhance firm performance.
However, national systems do not determine managerial strategies. At firm level, systemic options present managements, even in highly co-ordinated systems such as those in Germany, with considerable room for practices that differ from the clusters of ideal firm types specified by Whitley (Singe and Croucher, 2005) . 'High-trust' practices may also be attempted in low trust economies with varying degrees of success (Danford et al., 2005; Goergen et al., forthcoming) , and may be more supported by legal and institutional arrangements in 'low-trust' economies than sometimes recognised, as UK case studies have indicated (Deakin et al. 2006 ). On the other hand, perceived breaches of trust by managements in "high-trust" countries (for example, raising the intensity of monitoring or refusing real wage growth), may also occur. In these countries, an increase in monitoring 1 More specifically, Akerlof's (1982) model posits that monitoring is performed by employee groups. Excess remuneration to some members of the employee group and leniency of work rules constitute the major gifts by the employer to employees. Employees' gift to the employer -effort in excess of formal work standards -is linked to the employer's gift to employees. The key assumption in this mechanism is reciprocity as a major feature of gift exchange, as well as of market exchange. In gift exchanges, however, effort norms are established according to the 'fair day's work' concept rather than by market forces. In return employees expect to be treated fairly by the employer. The concept of fair treatment is not based on absolute standards but, rather, on comparisons of one's own situation with that of other individuals. Individuals use comparison with others as a guide to how they ought to behave or how they ought to be treated.
intensity, ceteris paribus, may cause reduced employees' effort and productivity even more drastically (Drago and Perlman, 1989; Goergen et al., forthcoming; Naastepad and Storm, 2006) .
In summary, our hypotheses on the optimality of HRM practices and their synergies within various institutional settings are as follows:
H1: Collaborative forms of HRM practice are more strongly associated with superior firm performance than calculative forms H2: These associations are strongest where national institutional and normative settings support them H3: Employer-employee consultative committees and collective payment methods are associated with superior firm performance.
Data and variables
We econometrically test the hypotheses derived from our theoretical analysis using data extracted from Cranet. We use data from the 1999/2000 round of surveys, while the study by Gooderham et al. (1999) , which we extend, uses the previous round of surveys in 1995/1996.
Since a central issue in our analysis is the importance of institutional factors and organisational practices for the labour extraction function, and thus for firm performance, we use data from several countries exhibiting diverse institutional settings and diverse labour management practices. Following this line of reasoning we also control for and compare results from samples with and without firms that are foreign subsidiaries. 2 The rationale is that although such firms' practices may generally be not that much different from those of the indigenous companies (Brewster, Wood and Brookes, 2008; Farndale, Brewster and Poutsma, 2008) 2 We report here results for samples where we do not exclude but control for the status of a firm being a foreign subsidiary. Using Wald tests of differences between coefficients estimated from the full and the restricted sample shows that the coefficients do not significantly differ. We report here results from the full sample with a control for foreign subsidiary status which does not appears to be statistically significant in any specification.
this is a complex relationship (ibid.) and may have been at least influenced by different country-of-origin institutional environments, albeit in a complex way as argued by Gooderham et al. (1998) .
The main dependent variable in our analysis is firm performance (perf) measured as a composite index comprised of five partial measures: service quality, level of productivity, profitability, product to market time, and rate of innovation. Each partial measure is an ordinal categorical variable. 3 We apply Mokken's nonparametric scaling approach to produce our synthetic performance measure (Mokken and Lewis, 1982) . The unweighted sum of item scores has to be monotonously related to the latent true scores as demonstrated by Sjitsma et al.(1990) . This implies that Mokken's model provides estimates of the scale scores only at ordinal level. As in other studies, the primary scaling criterion is Loevinger's Hcoefficient of homogeneity. A set of items constitute a scale if the total scale has a H-value exceeding 0.30; values above 0.50 indicate strong scales. The details of the items included in the performance scale, results of the scaling procedure, and reliability analysis are reported in Table 2 .
- Table 2 about hereAs noted above we believe absenteeism (abse) and turnover (turn) to be factors affecting the labour extraction function and we therefore add them to our analysis.
Absenteeism is measured as average days per employee per year. Turnover is the annual staff turnover in percent. Both measures of labour extraction are approximate and are affected by various economic and institutional country-specific factors in addition to the main determinants of the labour extraction function. With this caveat, linking absenteeism and turnover to human resource management practices in regressions where we have controlled for major economic and institutional factors for represents a useful empirical representation of our theoretical framework.
To formulate measures of the human resource management strategies within firms that approximate aspects of institutional environment at firm level as well we refer to the strategic HRM model of calculative or collaborative practices following Gooderham et al. (1999) .
Next, we extend the Gooderham et al. (1999) typology with a third measure explicitly reflecting the existence of joint consultative committees and group payment systems, which we designate group-based practices (grpr). In this index we include features at firm level reflecting the existence of joint employee consultative committees and profit-sharing schemes applied to different segments of the labour force. We expect that the index will capture some aspects of the impact of Akerlof's (1982) implicit gift exchange mechanism on labour extraction and ultimately on firm performance.
To develop measures for calculative and collaborative practices, we use Mokken's nonparametric latent trial model for unidimensional scaling (Mokken and Lewis, 1982) .
Thus, we follow the methodology used by Gooderham et al. (1999) which allows us to compare the measures of interest estimated with data from two consecutive rounds of surveys.
Mokken's approach does not make overly restrictive assumptions and provides an internal scaling criterion that ensures a unidimensional scale. This is an important advantage in this case where dichotomous items are used and do not satisfy the assumption of interval scale items. Details of the items included in the scales, results of the scaling procedure, and reliability analysis are reported in Table 1 . employees. As Gordon (1994) argues, the proportion of managers in the firm's employment approximates to the intensity of monitoring.
Finally, we control for several other firm characteristics affecting performance. These are log of firm size (lfsize) and log of firm age (lfage), qualitative characteristics of the labour force such as dummy variable indicating employees 45 years of age or older (eage45) and dummy variable indicating employees with at least higher education (eedugr). Market conditions are controlled for by a three-step ordinal scale (market) indicating whether the firm's market is booming, steady or stagnating. Industrial sector information -a set of industry dummy variables -is included in all regression specifications (except the base one).
In all regressions a control dummy variable for foreign-subsidiary status of firms is also included. Country dummy variables are used in all extended regression specifications to control for important variations in institutional settings. In selected specifications also crosseffects of the country dummies and HRM variables of interest are included in addition.
Summary statistics and short definitions of all regression variables are reported in Table 3 .
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- Tables 4a and 4b . We start with a base specification where only variables corresponding to the neoclassical efficiency-wage model are included. Then we extend the specification by introducing a richer set of controls and HRM practice variables. Second, we consider a direct empirical approximation of the labour extraction function, using two dependent variables, labour force turnover and absenteeism.
We extend the specifications in a manner similar to the performance regressions. The results are reported in Table 5a and Table 5b , respectively.
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- Table 4a (Table 4b) , thus controlling for the specific link between HRM practices and institutional settings, we find differential effects of the variables of interest on firm performance. Overall, the effect of collaborative practices is positive and significant in countries variously categorised in VoC literature as 'co-operative', 'co-ordinated' and so on (e.g., Scandinavia, Germany, France).
The group-based-practices variable significantly impacts performance of firms in the 'coordinated' category of country such as France. In most countries it seems that both types of HRM approach coexist; however, there usually is one dominant (or more important) type of practice affecting firm performance.
- Table 4b about hereThus, the results related to the interaction between HRM practices and countryspecific (institutional) conditions are of particular interest. Specifically, Table 4b shows that calculative practices affect performance positively (but not statistically significantly) in most countries analysed, compared to the reference country (the UK). The only country where calculative practices have a negative and statistically significant impact on performance is
Denmark. This may be related to the very specific evolution of Danish industrial relations (Due et al., 1994) . Collaborative practices seem to have stronger economic and statistically significant positive impacts on performance in several 'co-operative' or 'co-ordinated' countries variously such as France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium and Spain. With respect to group-based practices, UK firms appear to perform similar to firms in other countries as only firms in France outperform British firms. Group-based practices also have a positive but not statistically significant impact on performance in several other 'cooperative' or 'co-ordinated' countries.
The results in Table 5a and Table 5b confirm our main findings as the largest impact derives from collaborative and group-based practices. Absenteeism (Table 5a ) is lower in firms that employ any of the three types of practices, controlling for industry and country effects. Turnover (Table 5b) is also minimised by applying HRM practices. These results suggest that the labour extraction function is improved by systematic application of the practices at firm level. It is evident that collaborative and group-based practices have a stronger impact in both sets of regressions. When the link between HRM and countryspecific institutions is explored, we again find differential effects across countries and types of practice, in line with the different institutional contexts. These findings confirm our proposition that the labour extraction function should be viewed as endogenously determined by the interaction of the institutional environment and firm-specific HRM rather than as simply an exogenous trade-off between wages and monitoring as neoclassical efficiencywage theory asserts.
- Table 5a about hereSpecifically, in Table 5a , column (4), the interaction terms of collaborative practices measure are negative for all countries and are statistically significant for Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Austria. This suggests that collaborative practices improve labour extraction in every country. However, the impact is strongest in the four countries mentioned. The relationships depicted by the interaction terms of group-based practices measure are also negative everywhere, implying less absenteeism, except in Spain where the coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the impact of group-based practices on absenteeism is most statistically significant in the Scandinavian countries.
- Table 5b about here -
The results in Table 5b, 
Conclusion and discussion
The chapter has tested the theoretically derived hypothesis (H1) that collaborative forms of HRM are more likely to enhance the labour extraction process and firm performance than calculative alternatives. The proposition was supported in those countries where the institutional setting was most conducive to these organisational level practices (H2), which are essentially related to strong communication with employees. The countries concerned are the strongest versions of the 'Co-ordinated Market Economies' of Western Europe (Hall and Ginerich, 2005) . This supplements and is consistent with other studies' findings (Brewster et al., 2007a, b) in relation to forms of employee voice. Within these national contexts, different forms of voice are encouraged by the institutional framework and therefore coexist, mutually reinforcing each other, optimizing employee wages and working conditions, productivity and organizational performance (Hubler and Jirjahn, 2003) . In the UK context, inherent tensions between different forms of practice exist, with particularly strong pressures towards individualization and direct forms of expression (Bryson, 2004) .
Calculative practices had a weaker impact on the labour extraction function and firm performance. In the case of Denmark, these were negatively associated with performance and negatively associated with absenteeism and turnover. Denmark has an institutional framework providing especially strong support for collaborative practices, and has been categorised as an unambiguously 'Co-ordinated Market Economy' (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Hall and Gingerich, 2005) . Others, however, have categorized Denmark, along with the Netherlands, as flexicurity countries (Bekker, 2011; Madsen, 2004; Méda, 2011; Viebrock and Clasen, 2009 ), a separate form of market economy. It is distinctive within the CME category for its high degree of employer-union consensual decision taking, requiring relatively little state intervention for its maintenance (Due et al., 1994 (Due et al., , 2000 . This suggests that in a country with an especially strong institutional and normative disposition towards collaborative practices, the contrast between calculative practices and these contextual factors is so acute as to generate a counterproductive employee reaction and weaker firm performance.
We also tested the hypothesis (H3) that group-based practices might also generate improved employee-employer relationships and performance. The findings here are more mixed, but confirm and extend to other countries analyses, specifically to the German case (Addison et al., 2004; Singe and Croucher, 2005) . Other strongly collaborative national contexts gave similar results. The mixed nature of the findings concerning group-based practices is to be expected given the wide range of contents subsumed under this heading.
They also interact with other arrangements; their effectiveness is conditional on a wide range of factors, including how they are combined with other complementary approaches such as quality circles (Becker and Gerhart, 1996) . Group-based practices were expected to give positive results in countries where they were strongly supported by the context and again, this was the case. In Sweden, such practices had a strong effect on absenteeism in relation to the UK reference group, possibly because of their content but equally possibly because of the way that they act in line with the particularly strong collaborative institutional framework (Whitley, 1999) .
The limitations of this study are firstly that employee attitudes have not been directly tested and secondly that self-reported (subjective) measures of all the indicators are used. In the latter case, for reasons of confidentiality, the performance data cannot be matched with accounting data. However there is evidence of a strong correlation between managerial reports of firm performance and external, independent measures (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Geringer and Herbert, 1991; Powell, 1992) . Provided respondents are at a senior enough level (which is the case for the Cranet respondents), subjective and objective measures of performance converge and their relationships with independent variables are equivalent (Wall Mitchie, Patterson, Wood, Sheenhan, Clegg and West, 2004; c.f. Delaney and Huselid, 1996) .
Nonetheless, it would have been ideal to combine these with more objective measures as recommended by Wall et al. (2004) . Future research could usefully address both of these limitations. In the first case, that of employee attitudes, there is a particular need not only to approach the issue by survey data but also to combine survey data with other data (which might helpfully be observationally-derived) that could demonstrate the mechanisms at work at organisational level.
Nevertheless, our findings have significant implications for political economy. First, they provide underpinning for the utility of the 'CME' concept itself, which has been criticised for a lack of differentiation (Allen, 2004; Amable, 2003) , but which in respect of the employment practice-performance link appears to have some justification. On the other hand, the finding has a second consequence for the significance of the Varieties of Capitalism conceptualisation. Central to the Varieties of Capitalism formulation in its original form is the argument that particular national institutional configurations cannot be considered 'superior' to others. Rather, it is a question of the 'fit' between labour market practices, the mode of production ('Fordist' or 'flexible specialisation') at organisational level and the requirements of the markets being sold into that determine success in specific markets (Hall and Soskice, 2001 ). Becker (2007) has criticised the theory, suggesting that practices may be quite different from those envisaged by Hall and Soskice, but may nevertheless be 'equifunctional'. In this view, LMEs can perform as well as CMEs even in 'flexible specialisation' types of production if companies adopt 'equi-functional' practices. In short, companies operating in LMEs can succeed even in markets demanding high quality where they compensate for a lack of contextual support.
Our findings demonstrate that the CME model is superior in supporting productive efficiency at the organisational level. This is consistent with Panic (2007) 
